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start in the late 1960’s and early 70’s,1 fell into a quiet decline in the
1980’s, under the Reagan/Bush administrations.
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Introduction
Equal employment opportunity ("EEO") law, despite a roaring
start in the late 1960's and early 70's,1 fell into a quiet decline in the
1980's, under the Reagan/Bush administrations. Agency enforcement
declined,2 while scant attorneys' fee awards, coerced fee waivers and
other difficulties discouraged private representation of EEO plaintiffs. 3
Last term, the United States Supreme Court rendered a series of sig-
nificant EEO decisions.4 These decisions substantially altered the
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currently admitted to practice before the United States District Courts for the South-
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1. During its first five years of existence, the EEOC investigated more than 8,000
charges of sex discrimination; in 1972, the number of charges filed was still increasing.
H.R. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD-
MIN. NEWS 2137, 2139.
2. The EEOC filed seventy percent fewer cases in 1982 than in 1981. Options for
Conducting a Pay Equity Study of Federal Pay and Classification Systems, Hearings
before the Subcomm. on Compensation and Employee Benefits of the House Comm.
on Post Office and Civil Service, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 237 (1986) (testimony of Judy
Goldsmith, President, National Organization for Women). Ms. Goldsmith attributes
the decline to personnel and budget cuts overseen by President Reagan and to the
appointment of "high level personnel who are hostile to effective enforcement." Id. at
236-37; contra id. at 662 (testimony of Clarence Thomas, Chair, EEOC) (most of the
10,000 EEO charges filed annually with the EEOC resolved within one year).
3. Terry, Eliminating the Plaintiffs Attorney in Equal Employment Litigation:
A Shakespearean Tragedy, 5 LAB. LAW. (No. 1) 63 (Winter 1989); see also Bronner,
Civil Rights Act of 1990: Inside the Negotiations, Boston Globe, July 23, 1990, Na-
tional/Foreign Section, at 1 (judges appointed by Presidents Reagan and Bush per-
ceived as less likely to rule in favor of discrimination victims); Weiner, With Addition
of Souter to Court, Conservative Bulwark is in Place, Miami Herald, Oct. 14, 1990, at
18A (federal "bench has grown increasingly hostile to claims brought by women and
minorities") (quote attributed to Nan Aron, Alliance for Justice).
4. The primary decisions targeted by the Civil Rights Act of 1990 are: Wards
1
Judd: Burdens of Proof Under Title VII in the 90's: Wards Cove vs. The
Published by NSUWorks, 1991
Nova Law Review
framework for determining EEO cases by raising significant additional
barriers to potential discrimination suits. Congress reacted by passing
the Civil Rights Act of 1990, H.R. 4000, S. 2104 (1990), designed to
restore and, in a few instances, strengthen the rights and remedies pre-
viously available to EEO plaintiffs.
Despite substantial amendments aimed at making the bill accept-
able to the Bush administration, 5 the proposed Civil Rights Act contin-
ues to face the threat of a presidential veto. The veto threat is based
primarily upon the Act's provisions concerning the burden of proof in
cases based upon "unintentional" discrimination.6 President Bush, and
other opponents of the bill, claim that the bill will lead to the use of
hiring quotas.7 According to the bill's detractors, employers will insti-
tute hiring quotas to ensure that their work forces contain appropriate
percentages of women and racial, ethnic or religious minorities to avoid
potential litigation in which they would be required to demonstrate the
job-related nature of their employment practices.8 The bill's propo-
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 109 S.Ct. 2115 (1989) (burden of proof and evidentiary
standards in disparate impact cases); Martin v. Wilks, 109 S.Ct. 2180 (1989) (finality
of judgments mandating affirmative action programs); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies,
109 S.Ct. 2261 (1989) (statutes of limitations for challenging discriminatory seniority
systems); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989) (burden of proof in
mixed motive cases); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S.Ct. 1419 (1988) (en-
forcement of contracts under section 1981).
5. See infra text accompanying notes 68-75. The initial version of the bill (H.R.
4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., introduced February 7, 1990) and the version which
passed the Senate (S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.) are included in an Appendix to this
article. The Senate passed the amended bill by a 65-34 vote, despite the threatened
presidential veto. Senators OK Bill to Protect Civil Rights, Miami Herald, July 19,
1990, at IA, col. 1; Editorial, Fill Civil-Rights Needs, Miami Herald, August 2, 1990,
at 20A, col. 1. The House of Representatives subsequently passed a substantially iden-
tical amended bill by a vote of 272-154. The Civil Rights Act of 1990, CoNG. DIG.
196, 205 (August-September 1990).
6. See, e.g., A Red Herring in Black and White, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1990, at
14A; Edelman, How Will the President Play His Civil Rights Card?, Broward Review,
June 19, 1990, at 2.
7. "The number one concern that has been voiced by the bill's opponents was the
danger that the original language would result in hiring quotas." The Civil Rights Act
of 1990, CONG. DIG. 196, 214 (statement of Senator Dodd); Senators OK Bill to Pro-
tect Civil Rights, Miami Herald, July 19, 1990, at IA, 12A ("Most of the controversy"
surrounding the bill comes from provisions overruling Wards Cove).
8. E.g., The Civil Rights Act of 1990, CONG. DIG. 196, 213 (statement of Sena-
tor Hatch). The bill's opponents have ignored the holding of Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440 (1982), that a "bottom line" appropriate racial balance is no defense to a
Title VII claim. The proposed Civil Rights-Act does not purport to overrule Teal. Ad-
[Vol. 15
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nents, on the other hand, claim that the bill, for the most part, simply
re-establishes long-standing precedent concerning the burden of proof
in such cases. 9 Advocates of the bill further stress the absence of any
evidence that the standards to be restored by the bill have encouraged
the use of quotas. 10 These burden of proof issues will be the primary
focus of this article. 11
ditionally, at least some of the quota fears are based on misperceptions concerning the
availability of compensatory and punitive damages. The bill permits such damages only
in cases of intentional discrimination, not in adverse impact cases. See CONG. DIG. at
210 (statement of Senator Kennedy).
9. E.g., Quota Hogwash-Bogus Objections to Civil-Rights Bill, Seattle Times,
July 24, 1990, at A6 [hereinafter Quota Hogwash]; Editorial, Battle of the Minorities,
Miami Herald, May 28, 1990, at 14A, col. 1.
10. A Red Herring in Black and White, N.Y. Times, July 23, 1990, at 14A
("The best evidence of that danger [quota hiring] would be that from 1971 to 1989,
many employers in fact adopted quotas. But the Administration cites no such evi-
dence."); Battle of the Minorities, Miami Herald, May 28, 1990, at 14A ("When
pressed to say when in the past these criteria had created such quotas, Mr. Thornburgh
couldn't."); The Civil Rights Act of 1990, CONG. DIG. 196, 218 (statement of Senator
Simon); see also infra notes 68-75 and accompanying text.
11. The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990 also:
a. seeks to assure the availability of counsel to prospective plaintiffs by prohibiting
settlements predicated upon fee waivers. This section simply provides that cases may
not be settled, either by stipulation or dismissal, unless the parties or their counsel
attest to the court that a waiver of all or substantially all attorney's fees was not com-
pelled as a condition of the settlement. Such a provision is a necessary and predictable
solution to the moral, ethical and financial dilemma facing the plaintiff's lawyer con-
fronted with a settlement offer conditioned upon a waiver of fees. See Terry, supra note
3, at 71.
b. authorizes compensatory and punitive damage awards in cases of intentional
discrimination. These remedies were previously available only to victims of race dis-
crimination under section 1981, but not to Title VII or age discrimination claimants.
According to Senator Graham, a ten-year study of intentional race discrimination cases
found that no damages were awarded in 85 percent of the cases; the average award in
the remaining fifteen percent of the cases was about $40,000.00. The Civil Rights Act
of 1990, CONG. DIG. 196, 220 (remarks of Senator Graham, D-FL). If cases involving
allegations of intentional discrimination on other bases follow this pattern, the resulting
litigation is unlikely to pose a critical problem for employers. Moreover, as Senator
Kennedy put it, "[w]omen and minorities are not second-class citizens; they do not
deserve second-class remedies under the civil rights laws." Id. at 208.
c. limits challenges to court-ordered affirmative action programs;
d. provides that the statute of limitations for challenging seniority systems begins
to run when discriminatory effects occur, not when the systems themselves are first
implemented;
e. modifies the holding of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775 (1989),
3
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HISTORY OF EEO DEVELOPMENT
One of the earliest significant federal EEO statutes was enacted as
part of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.12 Title VII, as the statute came to
be known, prohibited discrimination in employment on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex or national origin.13 Protections for older em-
ployees and for handicapped workers in the public sector followed; the
frameworks developed in Title VII litigation were adapted for use in
these new areas as well.
14
Intentional Discrimination vs. Adverse Impact
The simplest and most obvious form of discrimination prohibited
by Title VII, intentional discrimination against members of a protected
class, came to be known as "disparate treatment. ' ' 15 When Title VII
became effective in mid-1965, intentional race and sex discrimination
was rampant and, to a great extent, socially acceptable. Indeed, news-
papers continued to run sex-segregated "help wanted" ads for several
more years. Employers, and many segments of the public, saw nothing
wrong in refusing to hire women or minorities for certain positions, or
paying them less than white males for similar work.18
concerning mixed-motive cases of intentional discrimination, to provide that any signifi-
cant reliance upon discriminatory motives constitutes a violation of the Act (see infra
note 28); and
f. overrules Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 108 S.Ct. 1419 (1988), by restor-
ing Section 1981's application to the enforcement as well as the making and termina-
tion of employment contracts.
12. After the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, several earlier statutes
(included within the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1871, now codified at 42 U.S.C. §§
1981, 1983 and 1985) began to be used to fight employment discrimination. Not until
1968, however, did the Court permit section 1981 to be used against private employers.
Jones v. Alfred Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). Other limitations continue to restrict
the utility of these statutes, including the recent holding in Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 109 S.Ct. 2363 (1989), one of the cases the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990
would overturn.
13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1964).
14. E.g., Pena v. Brattleboro Retreat, 702 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1983); Wood v.
Exxon Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1277 (S.D. Tex. 1987) (Title VII models of proof apply in
cases under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-637(1988)).
15. See, e.g., Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977).
16. Options for Conducting a Pay Equity Study of Federal .Pay and Classifica-
tion Systems, Hearings before the Subcomm. on Compensation and Employee Benefits
of the House Comm. on Post Office and Civil Service, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 60-61
[Vol. 15
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In time, the concept of intentional discrimination came to be pub-
licly frowned upon, perhaps because of the enforcement of Title VII.
Instances of blatant, clearly intentional discrimination declined. The
overall problem of employment discrimination, however, had hardly
been dented. By 1970, Congress recognized employment discrimination
as "a far more complex and pervasive phenomenon," appropriately de-
scribed in terms of "systems" rather than isolated intentional acts.17
Even now, persistent patterns of job segregation separating white men
from women and men of color,18 and the ever-present wage gap,19 sug-
gest that employment discrimination remains a substantial factor in the
modern American marketplace.20
In 1971, the Supreme Court recognized this dilemma and decided
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 21 In Griggs, the Court held that Title VII
did not contain an intent requirement, but instead prohibited "not only
overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but dis-
criminatory in practice. ' 22 As a result, the facially neutral criteria im-
posed by the Griggs employer-a high school degree requirement and
intelligence/aptitude tests-were subject to challenge under Title VII
because black employees and applicants were more often adversely af-
fected by the requirements than were white employees and applicants.
The Griggs Court went on to hold, however, that such facially neutral
criteria, even if discriminatory in practice, were nevertheless permissi-
(1985) (testimony of Dennis Dresang, Chair, Wisconsin Task Force on Comparable
Worth), 516-17 (statement by the Nat'l Federation of Fed. Employees), 594 (dissent-
ing Statement of Mary Frances Berry and Blandina Cardenas Ramirez of the U.S.
Comm. on Civil Rights); Blumrosen, Wage Discrimination, Job Segregation and Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 399, 402-07 (1979);
The Civil Rights Act of 1990, CONG. DIG. 196, 222 (August-September 1990) (re-
marks of Senator Reigle (D-Mich.) during July 18, 1990, Senate Floor Debate on
S.2104).
17. S. REP. No. 1137, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1970) (Committee on Labor and
Public Welfare). See generally M. E. GOLD, A DIALOG ON COMPARABLE WORTH
(1983); D. J. TREIMAN & H. I. HARTMANN, WOMEN, WORK AND WAGES (1981).
18. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE BUREAU, STATE OF WISCONSIN, COMPARABLE
WORTH: THE PAY EQUITY ISSUE (Informational Bulletin LRB-84-IB-2, June 1984).
19. Nat'l Comm. on Pay Equity, Newsnotes 15 (Dec. 1989).
20. See generally Judd & Gomez-Mejia, Comparable Worth: A Sensible Way to
End Pay Discrimination, or the "Looniest Idea Since Looney Tunes"?, in NEW PER-
SPECTIVES ON COMPENSATION ADMINISTRATION 61 (D. Balkin & L. Gomez-Mejia eds.
1987).
21. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
22. Id. at 431.
Judd
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ble if they were demonstrably job-related:
Nothing in the Act precludes the use of testing or measuring proce-
dures; obviously they are useful. What Congress has forbidden is
giving these devices and mechanisms controlling force unless they
are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance. Con-
gress has not commanded that the less qualified be preferred over
the better qualified simply because of minority origins. Far from
disparaging job qualifications as such, Congress has made such
qualifications the controlling factor, so that race, religion, national-
ity, and sex become irrelevant.23
These types of cases, which do not require proof of discriminatory in-
tent, are commonly called "adverse impact" cases.24
Models of Proof
Intentional Discrimination
The standard model of proof for intentional discrimination (dispa-
rate treatment) cases became firmly established in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green25 and its progeny.28 In these cases, the plaintiff must
present a prima facie case of intentional discrimination. 2" The employer
23. Id. at 436.
24. In practice, many courts and commentators use terms such as "disparate im-
pact" (probably a corruption of "disproportionate impact") and other labels to describe
adverse impact cases. To avoid the confusion generated by the use of two such similar
terms as "disparate treatment" and "disparate impact," this article will use only the
term "adverse impact" in referring to cases based upon unintentional discrimination.
25. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
26. E.g., Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
27. The precise parameters of the prima facie case will vary depending upon the
type of allegedly discriminatory employment practice. In a hiring case, for example, a
plaintiff would be required to demonstrate membership in a protected class, qualifica-
tion for the position applied for, rejection, and subsequent efforts by the employer to fill
the position with a person of similar qualifications. Promotion, compensation and dis-
charge cases require similar but not identical proofs. Of course, in the rare case in
which a Title VII plaintiff has compelling direct evidence of discrimination, he or she
need not use the McDonnell Douglas model. E.g., Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 715
F.2d 1552, 1556-57 (11th Cir. 1983). In this day and time, however, most employers
are too sophisticated to permit the availability of such direct evidence. E.g., id. at 1556;
see also LEDVINKA, NEW PERSPECTIVES ON COMPENSATION ADMIISTRATION 51, 55
(D. Balkin & L. Gomez-Mejia eds. 1987) ("[E]vidence of intent is usually hard to
find. Managers know that differential treatment of men and women is illegal, and they
6
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is then required to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason
for the adverse employment action against the plaintiff. The articula-
tion standard requires no quantum of proof; the employer need only
state a non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action.
The plaintiff must then prove that the employer's articulated reason is
a pretext, masking a discriminatory intent. The burden of proving the
employer's discriminatory intent remains at all times with the plain-
tiff.28 With the exception of mixed motive cases,2 9 this model of proof
was not affected by last term's decisions, nor is it addressed by the
proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990.0
are unlikely to do, say, or write anything indicating that they are aware of any such
treatment."); Weisberg, Sex Bias 'Victory' May Really Be a Sham, Broward Review,
July 16, 1990, at 10, 11 ("employers have become increasingly sophisticated about
concealing unlawful discrimination"); B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT Dis-
CRIMINATION LAW 15 (2d ed. 1983) ("Direct evidence of discriminatory motivation is
now relatively unusual.").
28. E.g., Watson v. Forth Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S.Ct. 2777, 2788-89
(1988). So-called "mixed motive" cases may be deemed a narrow exception to this
rule. See generally Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S. Ct. 1775 (1989) (plurality
opinion). In a mixed-motive case, where the plaintiff establishes that a discriminatory
motive played some role in causing the adverse employment decision, the burden of
proof shifts to the employer to prove, by a preponderance standard, that it would have
made the same decision even if it had not been influenced by the discriminatory motive.
If it can do so, it will not be found to have violated Title VII. Id. at 1787-92. The focus
in a mixed motive case, however, is primarily on causation. The plaintiff is still re-
quired to prove the existence of discriminatory intent.
The proposed Act addresses this decision by clarifying the fact that any reliance at
all upon discriminatory motives violates Title VII, even though available remedies may
be limited if the employer can establish that it would have reached the same decision
absent the improper motive. This section appears consistent with the position previously
taken by the Eighth Circuit in Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1320-24 (8th Cir. 1985)
(en banc). Four Circuits had previously required plaintiffs to prove "but for" causation,
while five had shifted the burden of proof to the employer to show that it would have
taken the same action regardless of the discriminatory factors. Of these, four required
only a preponderance of the evidence, while one required clear and convincing proof.
The Circuits had also been divided upon the issue of whether such a showing negated a
violation of Title VII, or merely prevented the imposition of equitable relief such as
reinstatement. Price Waterhouse, 109 S.Ct. at 1784 & n.2.
29. See supra note 28.
30. The Act does, however, expand the available remedies in this type of litiga-
tion to conform to the remedies available to victims of intentional race discrimination
under section 1981. See supra note 11.
Judd
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Adverse Impact
In adverse impact cases, a different model of proof developed. The
plaintiff's prima facie case required proof that the challenged criteria
had a significantly disproportionate adverse impact upon otherwise
qualified members of a protected class. Plaintiffs typically accom-
plished this proof through statistics comparing the percentage of pro-
tected class members in the relevant workforce to the percentage of
qualified protected class members in the relevant labor market,31 and
showing that the imbalance was caused by the challenged practices.32
In Dothard v. Rawlinson,3 for example, women comprised almost 37
percent of the total labor force, but less than 13 percent of the state's
correctional counselors. The reasons for the imbalance were minimum
height and weight requirements which excluded far more women than
men.
3 4
Several tests developed to determine whether the adverse impact
caused by a particular selection device was "significantly disproportion-
ate," none of which has gained uniform acceptance. The EEOC guide-
lines proposed a "four-fifths" or "eighty percent" rule of thumb: a cri-
terion is generally 5 deemed discriminatory if it results in a selection
rate, for any protected class, of less than eighty percent of the rate of
selection for the class with the highest selection rate under the same
criterion.38 Some courts have adopted this rule; others look to see if the
differential exceeds two or three "standard deviations.137 Still others
31. This segment of the plaintiff's case may not always be necessary, as evi-
denced by Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982). See supra note 8.
32. E.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) ("[T]o establish a
prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff need only show that the facially neutral
standards in question select applicants for hire in a significantly discriminatory
pattern.").
33. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
34. The height requirement, for example, disqualified about a third of all women,
but only a little over one percent of all men. The weight requirement excluded 22.29
percent of women and only 2.35 percent of men. The combination of the two require-
ments excluded over forty percent of Alabama's female workers from the position in
question. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329-30.
35. The eighty percent rule is neither a safe haven nor an absolute minimum.
Smaller disparities have been found discriminatory, and larger disparities have been
found acceptable. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D) (1990).
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(D), 1607.16(R) (1990).
37. A standard deviation is a statistical term describing some of the properties of
a data distribution. Most populations, when measured for any particular property, will
form a bell curve in which the majority of the population clusters around the average
[Vol. 15
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simply judge the significance of the adverse impact on a case by case
basis. 8
If the plaintiff proved his or her prima facie case, the employer
was then required to establish "business necessity." Business necessity
has traditionally been treated as an affirmative defense, so that the bur-
den of proof on that issue has been allocated to the employer. Accord-
ingly, the employer has been required to demonstrate that the chal-
lenged criteria were important to successful job performance. " Prior to
the Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,4° an em-
ployer could justify the use of tests or other devices shown to have a
discriminatory impact only by demonstrating through "professionally
accepted methods," that the criteria were "predictive of or significantly
correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or
are relevant to the job or jobs for which the candidates are being evalu-
ated. 41 If an employer established that the challenged practices were
sufficiently job-related, the plaintiff was then given an opportunity to
show that less discriminatory methods would accomplish the same pur-
pose equally well.42
The Evolving Model of Proof in Adverse Impact Cases
Last term, by a scant 5-4 majority, the Supreme Court decided
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.4' The Wards Cove employers oper-
ated canneries in remote areas of Alaska during the summer "salmon
run" season. Each cannery had two general types of positions: unskilled
cannery jobs and skilled non-cannery jobs. At each cannery, the un-
point, or "mean." The size of the population and the spread of its scores combine to
determine the size of a standard deviation. Pure chance will cause a small percentage
of the population to fall more than two standard deviations away from the average in
each direction, but statisticians believe that a difference of more than three standard
deviations indicates the presence of some distorting factor. See J. MCCLAVE & P. BEN-
SON, STATISTICS FOR BusINEss AND ECONOMics 491-92 (3d ed. 1985).
38. B. SCHLE & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 27, at 98-99.
39. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 426 (1975) (quoting Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 436 (1971)).
40. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
41. Albemarle Paper Co., 422 U.S. at 431; accord Dothard, 433 U.S. at 329.
42. E.g., Guardians Ass'n of the New York City Police Dept. v. Civil Serv.
Comm., 630 F.2d 79, 110 (2d Cir. 1980). Few opinions have even reached this step,
and in none of them has the plaintiff succeeded in demonstrating the viability of a less
discriminatory alternative. B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 27, at 156-57.
43. 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
1991]
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skilled positions were filled predominantly by non-whites (Filipinos and
Native Alaskans) hired through a local union, while the skilled posi-
tions were held primarily by whites, hired through other offices of the
companies located on the mainland. The employers maintained sepa-
rate dormitories and mess halls for the skilled and unskilled workers."'
The Wards Cove plaintiffs were a class of nonwhites who were or
had been employed in unskilled cannery positions. They alleged that
the employers used a number of hiring practices which adversely im-
pacted their protected class: nepotism, a rehire preference, lack of ob-
jective hiring criteria, separate hiring channels, and a policy against
promoting from within the workforce. The district court initially re-
fused to apply adverse impact analysis to any of the employers' subjec-
tive practices, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc,
reversed this holding. The Ninth Circuit panel determined that the
plaintiffs had made a prima facie adverse impact case, and remanded
the case to the district court for further proceedings with instructions
that the employer bear the burden of proving that its discriminatory
practices were job related.45
On certiorari review, the Supreme Court approved the application
of adverse impact analysis to subjective employment practices, but re-
versed the Ninth Circuit's determination that the plaintiffs had estab-
lished a prima facie case. The Court held that the plaintiffs' statistics
did not compare the appropriate groups.46 Having resolved the issue
before it, the Wards Cove majority went on, in unabashed dicta, 47 to
impose new evidentiary burdens upon adverse impact plaintiffs and to
reallocate the burden of proof on the issue of business necessity.
44. Id. at 2119-20.
45. Id. at 2120.
46. Id. at 2121-22.
47. The Court specifically admitted that "any inquiry into whether the disparate
impact that any employment practice may have had was justified by business neces-
sity" was pretermitted by its finding that the statistics relied on by the Ninth Circuit
did not suffice to make out a prima facie case. Id. at 2124. The Court then continued,
however, to address additional issues which were likely to surface upon remand. Id. But
see County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 166 n.7 (1981) ("We are not
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New Evidentiary Requirements and Shifting the Burden of
Proof
First, relying on dicta from the plurality opinion in Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust,48 the Wards Cove majority stated that adverse
impact plaintiffs must "isolat[e] and identify the specific employment
practices that are allegedly responsible for any observed statistical dis-
parities. 49 Moreover, the Wards Cove standard will require proof that
"each challenged practice has a significantly disparate impact on em-
ployment opportunities for whites and nonwhites.15 0 Adverse impact
plaintiffs will never be permitted to challenge a group of employment
practices as a whole.
The Wards Cove majority attempted to justify this ruling on the
grounds that Title VII plaintiffs will have access to the records which
most employers are required to keep concerning their employment
practices under existing EEOC guidelines.51 There are, however, many
businesses which, although subject to Title VII, qualify for exemptions
or exceptions to the record-keeping requirements of the guidelines.
Ironically, the Wardi Cove employers themselves had not kept any
such records.52
Secondly, the Wards Cove majority, again relying upon dicta from
the Watson plurality opinion, reallocated the burden of proof on the
business necessity issue, thus implicitly overruling Griggs and the sub-
stantial body of case law applying the Griggs standard. According to
the Wards Cove majority, the employer bears only the burden of pro-
48. 108 S.Ct. 2777 (1988). In Watson, a unanimous Court held that adverse
impact analysis may be applied to subjective, as well as objective, employment prac-
tices, thus resolving a long-standing division among the federal circuit courts. A plural-
ity consisting of Justices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor and Scalia then went on to dis-
cuss the allocation of the burdens of proof in adverse impact cases, thus laying the
groundwork for the Wards Cove decision. Justices Stevens and Blackman frankly ac-
knowledged that the issues discussed in the plurality opinion were unnecessary to the
resolution of the question presented. Id. at 2787 n.1. Some commentators interpreted
Watson as changing the rules of adverse impact analysis only when applied to subjec-
tive criteria, as in Watson itself. See, e.g., When Doctrines Collide: Disparate Treat-
ment, Disparate Impact, and Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 137 U. PA. L. REv.
1755 (1989). The Wards Cove Court, however, adopted the new analysis for use in all
adverse impact cases. See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
49. Wards Cove, 109 S.Ct. at 2125 (citing Watson, 108 S.Ct. at 2787).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2125.
52. Id. at 2133 n.20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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ducing evidence of a business justification for the challenged practices.
The burden of persuasion, or proof, on this issue now falls on the plain-
tiff, who must demonstrate that the practice is not "job-related."
The Wards Cove majority avoided expressly overruling the volumi-
nous body of precedent applying the Griggs standard, under which the
employer bore the burden of proof of business necessity. They insisted
that these cases "should have been understood to mean an employer's
production-but not persuasion-burden."53  The language of the
Court's prior rulings, however, renders this evasion disingenuous.5
Griggs has long been understood by both courts55 and commentators56
to allocate the burden of proving business necessity to the employer.
53. Id. at 2126.
54. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977) ("If the employer proves
that the challenged requirements are job related . . . "); Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) ("Title VII forbids the use of employment tests that
are discriminatory in effect unless the employer meets 'the burden of showing that any
given requirement [has] . . . a manifest relationship to the employment in ques-
tion.' "); id. at 407 ("if an employer does then meet the burden of proving that its tests
are 'job related' "); Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431 ("If an employment practice which oper-
ates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice
is prohibited."); id. at 432 ("Congress has placed on the employer the burden of show-
ing that any given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in
question.").
55.. E.g., Powers v. Alabama Dep't of Educ., 854 F.2d 1285, 1292 & n.11 (11th
Cir. 1988):
We are aware that four members of the Supreme Court recently have indi-
cated that the burden of proof on the absence of business necessity rests
with the plaintiff. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 108 S. Ct.
2777, 2790, 101 L.Ed. 2d 827 (1988). A plurality opinion, however, is not
binding precedent, and in the meantime, we are bound'by several decisions
of this court (as well as the Supreme Court cases cited in the text) stating
flatly that the employer bears the burden of proving that a practice is job-
related.
(emphasis in original); Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 1989) (describ-
ing the term "'business necessity' defense" as a misnomer after Wards Cove because
"the 'defense' does not require a showing of necessity and is no longer an affirmative
defense"); see also Chrisner v. Complete Auto Trans., Inc., 645 F.2d 1251, 1263 (6th
Cir. 1981) ("Once the defendant in a Title VII disparate impact case has rebutted the
plaintiff's prima facie case by proving a business necessity defense, the burden shifts
back to the plaintiff.").
56. E.g., LEDVINKA, supra note 27, at 53-55 ("If the couxt decides that the
plaintiff has established a prima facie case, the burden of proof shifts to the defendant.
The defendant's burden is to rebut by presenting evidence that the practice is job-
related or a business necessity."); B. ScHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, supra note 27, at 81-92,
& 17 (Supp. 1983).
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Application of Wards Cove and Watson
Isolating the Impact of Each Specific Practice
The new evidentiary requirements established in Wards Cove may
be devastating to many potential Title VII plaintiffs, particularly where
statistical proof is involved. In many cases, it may be difficult or impos-
sible to isolate the effects of one of a group of employment practices
because two or more of the practices may be "multicolinear. ' ' 57 In
Griggs, for example, it seems likely that the high school degree require-
ment eliminated many of the same individuals who would also have
been eliminated by their scores on the intelligence/aptitude tests. A
statistical model testing the effects of both practices simultaneously,
therefore, could easily show that neither practice had a statistically sig-
nificant impact on black applicants.5 8 While there are statistical meth-
ods for detecting and correcting for such difficulties, they are far from
foolproof.
Another potential problem arises in cases in which the employers,
like those in Wards Cove, fail to keep the records necessary to permit
detailed statistical analyses of each individual employment practice.
Typical Title VII plaintiffs are in no position to maintain, or attempt to
reconstruct, such records. The typical plaintiffs are not privy to those
type of records because they typically do not hold upper management
positions. Often these plaintiffs have lost their jobs and are no longer
even authorized to be on the premises. Under Wards Cove, therefore, a
Title VII plaintiff's cause of action may be destroyed by an employer's
failure to keep adequate records-a result unlikely to be permitted in
any other area of the law. 9
Even more problematic are cases in which two or more practices
combine to have a significant discriminatory effect even though no sin-
gle practice, used alone, would do so.6 0 Under Wards Cove and Wat-
57. See J. MCCLAVE & P. BENSON, STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS
491-92 (3d ed. 1985).
58. See id. at 491.
59. In many areas of the law, the burden of proof has been shifted from one
party to another to combat such problems. 29 AM. JUR. 2D, Evidence § 131, at 164-65
(2d ed. 1967); see also E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 337, at 787 (1984);
cf. Bell v. Birmingham Linen Serv., 752 F.2d 1552, 1558 & n.13 (11th Cir. 1983).
60. "One can envision a situation in which there are two subjective practices,
such as a performance rating by a supervisor and an interview, which work together to
produce a significant adverse impact." When Doctrines Collide: Disparate, Treatment
Disparate Impact, and Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1755,
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son, a group of practices will never be subject to challenge. Not even
the amicus brief of the United States Solicitor General, submitted on
behalf of the employers, urged this result. The Solicitor General's brief
readily admitted that a complex, multi-factor selection test could be
challenged as a whole, at least where it was not feasible to separate the
effects of the individual factors.61
Proving Business Necessity
As Justice Stevens noted in his Wards Cove dissent, business ne-
cessity has, since the 1971 Griggs decision, been regarded as an affirm-
ative defense-a legal justification for the use of an employment prac-
tice despite its proven discriminatory effect.62 As such, the burden of
proof must fall on the defendant, as does the burden of proving all
manner of affirmative defenses in various fields of law."' The Wards
Cove majority, however, disregarded the defensive nature of the issue
and instead analogized to the "articulation" and "pretext" standards
used in disparate treatment cases.
The pretext standard serves as a means for determining the exis-
tence of discriminatory intent, which is a necessary element of proof in
disparate treatment cases. If a specific, isolated adverse employment
action was not motivated by discriminatory motive, then it was not dis-
criminatory for purposes of Title VII, even if the victim happened to
belong to a protected class.64 An unfair or irrational employment deci-
sion, motivated by non-discriminatory reasons, does not violate Title
VII. Pretext analysis, therefore, measures a necessary element of the
plaintiff's case.
In impact cases, on the other hand, intent is not at issue. Impact
analysis focuses upon widely-used employment practices which affect
many employees, not on specific employment actions affecting only one
employee. Business necessity does not come into play until after such a
1781 n.134 (1989).
61. Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2132 n.19 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting the
Solicitor General's brief at page 22).
62. 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 1270-71, at
411-47 (2d ed. 1990).
63. See 29 AM. JUR. 2D, Evidence §§ 129-30, at 162-64 (2d ed. 1967); 23 FLA.
JUR. 2D, Evidence and Witnesses §§ 67, 75, 94-95, 102-03 (1980).
64. Title VII prohibits "discrimination rather than simple arbitrariness or ca-
price." Lilly v. Harris-Teeter Supermarket, 720 F.2d 326, 338 (4th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 466 U.S. 951 (1984).
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practice has been shown to discriminate against protected class mem-
bers. Business necessity is then used to justify or excuse the established
discrimination. Business necessity, therefore, unlike pretext analysis,
fits the classic definition of an affirmative defense: It acknowledges the
existence of a prima facie case, but offers a means of avoiding liability.
Accordingly, the Wards Cove analogy between pretext and business ne-
cessity either mixes apples (elements) and oranges (defenses), or im-
plies a hidden intent requirement-a requirement that facially neutral
employment practices be used as a "mere pretext" to hide intentional
discrimination-where there has been no such requirement for nearly
twenty years.
The Civil Rights Act of 1990
The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990, as originally introduced in
the House on February 7, 1990, addressed the Watson/Wards Cove
opinions by expressly providing that Title VII plaintiffs may challenge
a group of employment practices, defined as "a combination of employ-
ment practices or an overall employment process," without being re-
quired to demonstrate which particular practice or practices caused the
adverse impact.65 Additionally, the initial version of H.R. 4000 specifi-
cally placed the burdens of both proof and production of business ne-
cessity on the employer.66 Moreover, the original version of H.R. 4000
incorporated one of the Court's most stringent characterizations of the
business necessity defense: "essential to effective job performance. 67
These provisions provoked a storm of protests that the bill would
require employers to use "quotas" to avoid racial, ethnic or gender im-
balances in their work forces to avoid Title VII liability.68 The revised
65. H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 3 (Feb. 7, 1990) (amending 42 U.S.C. §
2000e).
66. Id. at § 4 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(k)).
67. Id. § 3 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(o)). This characterization of the busi-
ness necessity defense was apparently drawn from Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S.
331, 332 n.14 (1977) ("[A] discriminatory employment practice must be shown to be
necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII challenge.").
Most cases do not apply such a strict definition of business necessity, and use the term
more or less interchangeably with the term "job relatedness." E.g., Griggs, 401 U.S. at
424.
68. E.g., Kilpatrick, Employee Provision Unfair-and Perverts Bias Fight,
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bill, as passed by the Senate, eliminates much of the basis for such
fears, but remains unacceptable to the Bush administration. 9 The re-
vised bill70 allows plaintiffs to challenge a discrete group of practices,
but not to simply claim that the "overall employment process" discrim-
inates. Moreover, multi-practice challenges can be blocked "if the court
finds that the complaining party can identify, from records or other
information of the respondent reasonably available[,]" the specific
practice or practices responsible for the disproportionate adverse im-
pact.7 ' In that event, Title VII plaintiffs will be required to follow the
Wards Cove standards in isolating the specific practices allegedly re-
sponsible for the adverse impact. Only when the effects of multiple em-
ployment practices are inextricably mingled, whether because of their
inherent natures or because of inadequate employer records, will plain-
tiffs be permitted to proceed against the practices as a group. Because
the employer controls both the practices used and the recordkeeping
process,7 2 such an exception seems both fair and reasonable, particu-
larly when compared with the alternative. The revised bill also replaces
the onerous "essential to effective job performance" definition of the
initial bill with more detailed language, set forth below, coupled with a
proviso that the bill's intent is to restore the Griggs "job related" stan-
dard. The detailed definitional section provides:
(o)(1) The term 'required by business necessity' means--
(A) in the case of [selection] practices . . ., the practice or
group of practices must bear a significant relationship to s;uccessful
performance of the job; or
(B) in the case of employment practices that do not involve
selection, the practice or group of practices must bear a significant
relationship to a significant business objective of the employer.7 1
The revised bill, unlike its predecessor, goes on to describe the quantum
of proof an employer must present to prevail on a business necessity
defense:
69. Bronner, Civil Rights Act of 1990: Inside the Negotiations, Boston Globe,
July 23, 1990, National/Foreign Section, at 1.
70. See Appendix following this article of S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2d Sess.
71. Id. at § 4(k)(1)(B)(iii).
72. "[It is the employer who designs and evaluates job requirements and pos-
sesses all the evidence and information relating to its own hiring practices." CONG.
DIG., supra note 8, at 222 (statement of Senator Reigle).
73. See supra note 70, at § 3(o)(1).
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(2) In deciding whether the standards in paragraph (1) for busi-
ness necessity have been met, unsubstantiated opinion and hearsay
are not sufficient; demonstrable evidence is required. The defendant
may offer as evidence statistical reports, validation studies, expert
testimony, prior successful experience and other evidence as per-
mitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the court shall give
such weight, if any, to such evidence as is appropriate.74
These provisions essentially restore and clarify the Griggs standard
which, in eighteen years of application, has never been shown to cause
any employer to resort to the use of a "quota" system. 5
On July 31, 1990, the House Judiciary Committee reported H.R.
4000 to the House floor with revisions almost identical to those made
by the Senate. The revised bill subsequently passed the House by a vote
of 272-154.71 Both versions of the bill expressly provide that they are
not to be construed to require the use of quotas. The technical differ-
ences between the House and Senate versions of the proposed Act were
easily reconciled via House-Senate conference, but the Act still could
not avoid presidential veto.7 The Act missed "veto-proof' status by
only two votes in the Senate, but by twelve in the House.
7 8
Conclusion
There can be no doubt that Wards Cove and the other decisions
targeted by the Civil Rights Act of 1990 represent a serious departure
from an established body of precedent applying Title VII adverse im-
pact analysis. The Court often attempts to underplay the importance of
74. Id. at § 3(o)(2).
75. Quota Hogwash, supra note 9; Red Herring in Black and White, supra note
6; Gerstel, Threat of Racial Quotas Dogs Civil Rights Bill, Washington News, July
19, 1990; Edelman, supra note 6; CONG. DIG., supra note 8, at 218 (remarks of Sena-
tor Graham from Senate floor debate of July 18, 1990) ("In a series of four hearings
on the bill, the Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources discovered no evi-
dence to suggest that the Griggs standard-which this bill will return to--has led to
quotas.").
76. CONG. DIG., supra note 8, at 205. The House version contains an additional
subsection concerning the burden of proof in impact cases which expressly provides
that a mere statistical imbalance in a workforce may not constitute a prima facie case
of adverse impact discrimination.
77. N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1990, at IA.
78. CoNG. DIG., supra note 8, at 205; N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1990, at IA.
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its rulings by pointing to Congress' ability to overturn them.79 Reliance
upon that maxim in the case of last term's decisions, however, is as
transparently inappropriate as the Wards Cove Court's denial that its
decision reversed the voluminous body of case law applying the Griggs
standard. Congress has had many opportunities to review the Griggs
opinion since that case was decided in 1971. Its election not to do so
constitutes at least tacit approval of the decision. Moreover, many com-
mentators construe the 1972 amendments to Title VII as an express
legislative approval of the Griggs doctrine.80 The Wards Cove Court
preempted Congress' prerogative by overruling established case law,
thus forcing Congress to act to simply maintain the approved status
quo. Such conduct is as much an example of judicial activism as many
of the decisions derided by the Justices who, although allegedly sub-
scribing to theories of judicial restraint, made up the Wards Cove
majority.
Although it should not have been required to do so, Congress has
now acted to restore the settled and approved application of Title VII.
The proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990, despite the flood of rhetoric
launched by its critics, does not deserve the notoriety it has gained' The
most controversial provision of the bill does little more than restore
long-standing, legislatively-ratified precedent in the field of EEO law.
The Griggs standard, which the Act would restore, became known and
understood by all participants in the employment law arena during its
eighteen years of operation, 81 without resulting in the use of quota sys-
tems or crippling litigation. Passage of the Act will simply restore that
familiar standard.
The Watson/Wards Cove standards, on the other hand, would de-
prive many deserving EEO plaintiffs of any opportunity for relief, and
encourage the continued use of ineffective, discriminatory employment
practices that cannot be shown to have any relationship to the jobs in
question. To permit these decisions to stand would eviscerate the ad-
verse impact doctrine and eliminate years of progress in the battle for
79. See Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S.Ct. 2362, 2373 (1988);
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 423.
80. See Halverson, Title VII: Application of Impact Analysis to Subjective Em-
ployment Criteria-Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 108 S.Ct. 2777 (1988), 24
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 264, 268 & n.27 (1989).
81. LEDVINKA, supra note 27, at 53 ("Personnel specialists are quite familiar
with the concept of disparate impact, partly because so many personnel practices are
undertaken with the best of motives but end up working to the disadvantage of some
race, sex, or ethnic group.").
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equal employment opportunity for all qualified workers.
Author's Note:
As this article went to press, President Bush vetoed this bill, and
the Senate failed, by one vote, to override the veto. The bill's sponsors,
however, have already announced plans to reintroduce it in 1991.
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To amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to restore and strengthen civil
rights laws that ban discrimination in employment, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Civil Rights Act of 1990".
SEC. 2 FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINGS.-Congress finds that-
(1) in a series of recent decisions addressing employment
discrimination claims under Federal law, the Supreme Court cut
back dramatically on the scope and effectiveness of civil rights
protections; and
(2) existing protections and remedies under Federal law are
not adequate to deter unlawful discrimination or to compensate
victims of such discrimination.
(b) PURPOSEs.-The purposes of this Act are-
(1) to respond to the Supreme Court's recent decisions by
restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically limited
by those decisions; and
(2) to strengthen existing protections and remedies available
under Federal civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence
and adequate compensation for victims of discrimination.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
Section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e) is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:
"(1) The term 'complaining party' means the Commission,
the Attorney General, or a person who may bring an action or
proceeding under this title.
"(m) The term 'demonstrates' means meets the burdens of
production and persuasion.
"(n) The term 'group of employment practices' means a
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"(o) The term 'required by business necessity' means essential
to effective job performance.
"(p) The term 'respondent' means an employer, employment
agency, labor organization, joint labor-management committee, or
those Federal entities subject to the provisions of section 717.".
SEC. 4 RESTORING THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPARATE
IMPACT CASES.
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2)
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(k) PROOF OF UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN
DISPARATE IMPACT CASES.-
"(1) An unlawful employment practice is established under
this subsection when-
"(A) a complaining party demonstrates that an
employment practice results in a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that such practice is required
by business necessity; or
"(B) a complaining party demonstrates that a group of
employment practices results in a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that such practices are
required by business necessity, except that-
"(i) if a complaining party demonstrates that a
group of employment practices results in a disparate
impact, such party shall not be required to demonstrate
which specific practice or practices within the group
results in such disparate impact; and
"(ii) if the respondent demonstrates that a specific
employment practice within such group of employment
practices does not contribute to the disparate impact, the
respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such
practice is required by business necessity.
"(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is
required by business necessity may be used as a defense only
against a claim under this subsection.".
SEC. 5. CLARIFYING PROHIBITION AGAINST IMPERMISSIBLE
CONSIDERATION OF RACE, COLOR, RELIGION, SEX OR
NATIONAL ORIGIN IN EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
(42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) (as amended by section 4) is further amended by
1991]
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adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(1) Discriminatory Practice Need not be Sole Motivating
Factor.-Except as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice, even though such
practice was also motivated by other factors."
(b) ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS.-Section 706(g) of such Act (42
U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)) is amended by inserting before the period in the
last sentence the following: "or, in a case where a violation is
established under section 703(1), if the respondent establishes that it
would have taken the same action in the absence of any
discrimination".
SEC. 6. FACILITATING PROMPT AND ORDERLY RESOLUTION
OF CHALLENGES TO EMPLOYMENT ]PRACTICES
IMPLEMENTING LITIGATED OR CONSENT JUDGMENTS OR
ORDERS.
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2)
(as amended by sections 4 and 5) is further amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new subsection:
"(m) FINALITY OF LITIGATED OR CONSENT JUDGMENTS OR
ORDERS.-
"(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except
as provided in paragraph (2), an employment practice that
implements a litigated or consent judgment or order resolving a
claim of employment discrimination under the United States
Constitution or Federal civil rights laws may not be challenged in
a claim under the United States Constitution or Federal civil
rights law-
"(A) by a person who, prior to the entry of such
judgment or order, had-
"(i) notice from any source of the proposed
judgment or order sufficient to apprise such person that
such judgment or order might affect the interests of such
person; and
"(ii) a reasonable opportunity to present objections
to such judgment or order;
"(B) by a person with respect to whom the requirements
of subparagraph (A) are not satisfied, if the court determines
that the interests of such person were adequately represented
by another person who challenged such judgment or order
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prior to or after the entry of such judgment or order; or
"(C) if the court that entered the judgment or order
determines that reasonable efforts were made to provide
notice to interested persons.
A determination under subparagraph (C) shall be made prior to
the entry of the judgment or order, except that if the judgment or
order was entered prior to the date of the enactment of this
subsection, the determination may be made at any reasonable
time.
"(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to-
"(A) alter the standards for intervention under rule 24 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure;
"(B) apply to the rights of parties to the action in which
the litigated or consent judgment or order was entered, or of
members of a class represented or sought to be represented in
such action, or of members of a group on whose behalf relief
was sought in such action by the Federal government; or
"(C) prevent challenges to a litigated or consent
judgment or order on the ground that such judgment or order
was obtained through collusion or fraud, or is transparently
invalid or was entered by a court lacking subject matter
jurisdiction.
"(3) Any action, not precluded under this subsection, that
challenges an employment practice that implements a litigated or
consent judgment or order of the type referred to in paragraph (1)
shall be brought in the court, and if possible before the judge, that
entered such judgment or order.".
SEC. 7. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; APPLICATION TO
CHALLENGES TO SENIORITY SYSTEMS.
(a) STATUTE OF LMITATIONS.-Section 706(e) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)) is amended-
(1) by striking out "one hundred and eighty days" and
inserting in lieu thereof "2 years";
(2) by inserting after "occurred" the first time it appears "or
has been applied to affect adversely the person aggrieved,
whichever is later.";
(3) by striking out ", except that in" and inserting in lieu
thereof ".In"; and
(4) by striking out "such charge shall be filed" and all that
follows through "whichever is earlier, and".
(b) APPLICATION TO CHALLENGES TO SENIORITY SYSTEMS-
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Section 703(h) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) is amended by
inserting after the first sentence the following new sentence: "Where a
seniority system or seniority practice is part of a collective bargaining
agreement and such system or practice was included in such agreement
with the intent to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin, the application of such system or practice during the
period that such collective bargaining agreement is in effect shall be an
unlawful employment practice.".
SEC. 8. PROVIDING FOR DAMAGES IN CASES OF
INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION.
Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-
5(g)) is amended by inserting before the last sentence the following
new sentences: "With respect to an unlawful employment practice
(other than an unlawful employment practice established in accordance
with section 703(k))-
"(A) compensatory damages may be awarded; and
"(B) if the respondent (other than a government, government
agency, or a political subdivision) engaged in the unlawful
employment practice with malice, or with reckless or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others, punitive
damages may be awarded against such respondent;
in addition to the relief authorized by the preceding sentences of this
subsection, except that compensatory damages shall not include
backpay or any interest thereon. If compensatory or punitive damages
are sought with respect to a claim arising under this title, any party
may demand a trial by jury.".
SEC. 9. CLARIFYING ATTORNEYS' FEES PROVISION.
Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-
5(k)) is amended-
(1) by inserting "(1)" after "(k)";
(2) by inserting "(including expert fees and other
litigation expenses) and" after "attorney's fee,";
(3) by striking out "as part of the"; and
(4) by adding at the end thereof the following new
paragraphs:
"(2) A court shall not enter a consent order or judgment
settling a claim under this title, unless the parties and their
counsel attest that a waiver of all or substantially all
attorneys' fees was not compelled as a condition of the
settlement.
"(3) In any action or proceeding in which any judgment
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or order granting relief under this title is challenged, the
court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party in the
original action (other than the Commission or the United
States) to recover from the party against whom relief was
granted in the original action a reasonable attorney's fee
(including expert fees and other litigation expenses) and costs
reasonably incurred in defending (as a party, intervenor or
otherwise) such judgment or order.".
SEC. 10. PROVIDING FOR INTEREST, AND EXTENDING THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, IN ACTIONS AGAINST THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16)
is amended-
(1) in subsection (c), by striking out "thirty days" and
inserting in lieu thereof "ninety days"; and
(2) in subsection (d), by inserting before the period ", and the
same interest to compensate for delay in payment shall be
available as in cases involving non-public parties".
SEC. 11. CONSTRUCTION.
Title XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000h et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
"SEC. 1107. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
LAWS
"(a) EFFECTUATION OF PuRPOsE.-All Federal laws protecting the
civil rights of persons shall be broadly construed to effectuate the
purpose of such laws to eliminate discrimination and provide effective
remedies.
"(b) NONLIMITATION.-Except as expressly provided, no Federal
law protecting the civil rights of persons shall be construed to restrict
or limit the rights, procedures, or remedies available under any other
Federal law protecting such civil rights.".
SEC. 12 RESTORING PROHIBITION AGAINST ALL RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN THE MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT OF
CONTRACTS.
Section 1977 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42
U.S.C. 1981) is amended-
(1) by inserting "(a)" before "All persons within"; and
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(b) For purposes of this section, the right to 'make and enforce
contracts' shall include the making, performance, modification and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
Judd
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terms and conditions of the contractual relationship.".
SEC. 13. LAWFUL COURT-ORDERED REMEDIES,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND CONCILIATION AGREEMENTS
NOT AFFECTED.
Nothing in the amendments made by this Act shall be construed
to affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation
agreements that are otherwise in accordance with the law.
SEC. 14. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this Act, or an amendment made by this Act,
or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances is
held to be invalid, the remainder of this Act and the amendments made
by this Act, and the application of such provision to other persons and
circumstances, shall not be affected thereby.
SEC. 15. APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS AND TRANSITION
RULES.
(a) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.-The amendments made by-
(1) section 4 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or
commenced after June 5, 1989;
(2) section 5 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or
commenced after May 1, 1989;
(3) section 6 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or
commenced after June 12, 1989;
(4) sections 7(a)(1), 7(b), 8, 9, 10, and 11 shall apply to all
proceedings pending on or commenced after the date of enactment
of this Act;
(5) paragraphs (2) through (4) of section 7(a) shall apply to
all proceedings pending on or commenced after June 12, 1989; and
(6) section 12 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or
commenced after June 15, 1989.
(b) TRANSITION RULES.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Any orders entered by a court between the
effective dates described in subsection (a) and the date of
enactment of this Act that are inconsistent with the amendments
made by sections 4, 5, 7(a)(2) through (4), or 12, shall be vacated
if, not later than 1 year after such date of enactment, a request for
such relief is made.
(2) SECTION 6.-Any orders entered between June 12, 1989
and the date of enactment of this Act, that permit a challenge to
an employment practice that implements a litigated or consent
judgment or order and that is inconsistent with the amendment
made by section 6, shall be vacated if, not later than 6 months
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after the date of enactment of this Act, a request for such relief is
made. For the 1-year period beginning on the date of enactment of
this Act, an individual whose challenge to an employment practice
that implements a litigated or consent judgment or order is denied
under the amendment made by section 6, or whose order or relief
obtained under such challenge is vacated under such section, shall
have the same right of intervention in the case in which the
challenged litigated or consent judgment or order was entered as
that individual had on June 12, 1989.
(c) PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS.-The period of limitations for the
filing of a claim or charge shall be tolled from the applicable effective
date described in subsection (a) until the date of enactment of this Act,
on a showing that the claim or charge was not filed because of a rule or
decision altered by the amendments made by sections 4, 5, 7(a)(2)
through (4), or 12.
27
Judd: Burdens of Proof Under Title VII in the 90's: Wards Cove vs. The







To amend the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to restore and strenghten
civil rights laws that ban discrimination in employment, and for other
purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the "Civil Rights Act of 1990".
SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.
(a) FINDINS.-Congress finds that-
(1) in a series of recent decisions addressing employment
discrimination claims under Federal law, the Supreme Court cut
back dramatically on the scope and effectiveness of civil rights
protections; and
(2) existing protections and remedies under Federal law are
not adequate to deter unlawful discrimination or to compensate
victims of such discrimination.
(b) PuRPosES.-It is the purpose of this Act to--
(1) respond to the Supreme Court's recent decisions by
restoring the civil rights protections that were dramatically limited
by those decisions; and
(2) strengthen existing protections and remedies available
under Federal civil rights laws to provide more effective deterrence
and adequate compensation for victims of discrimination.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
Section 701 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e) is
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsections:
"(1) The term 'complaining party' means the Commission, the
Attorney General, or a person who may bring an action or
proceeding under this title.
"(m) The term 'demonstrates' means meets the burdens of
production and persuasion.
"(n) The term 'group of employment practices' means a
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" combination of employment practices that produces one or more
decisions with respect to employment, employment referral, or
admission to a labor organization, apprenticeship or other training
or retraining program.
"(o)(1) The term 'required by business necessity' means-
"(A) in the case of employment practices involving
selection (such as hiring, assignment, transfer, promotion,
training, apprenticeship, referral, retention, or membership in
a labor organization), the practice or group of practices must
bear a significant relationship to successful performance of
the job; or
"(B) in the case of employment practices that do not
involve selection, the practice or group of practices must bear
a significant relationship to a significant business objective of
the employer.
"(2) In deciding whether the standards in paragraph (1) for
business necessity have been met, unsubstantiated opinion and
hearsay are not sufficient; demonstrable evidence is required. The
defendant may offer as evidence statistical reports, validation
studies, expert testimony, prior successful experience and other
evidence as permitted by the Federal Rules of Evidence, and the
court shall give such weight, if any, to such evidence as is
appropriate.
"(3) This subsection is meant to codify the meaning of
'business necessity' as used in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. (401 U.S.
424 (1971)) and to overrule Ward's Cove Packing Co., Inc. v.
Atonio (109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989)).
"(p) The term 'respondent' means an employer, employment
agency, labor organization, joint labor-management committee
controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining
programs, including on-the-job training programs, or those Federal
entities subject to the provisions of section 717 (or the heads
thereof).".
SEC. 4. RESTORING THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN DISPARATE
IMPACT CASES.
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2)
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new subsection:
"(k) PROOF OF UNLAWFUL EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES IN
DISPARATE IMPACT CASES.-
"(1) An unlawful employment practice based on disparate
impact is established under this section when-
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"(A) a complaining party demonstrates that an
employment practice results in a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that such practice is required
by business necessity; or
"(B) a complaining party demonstrates that a group of
employment practices results in a disparate impact on the
basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin, and the
respondent fails to demonstrate that such group of
employment practices are required by business necessity,
except that-
"(i) except as provided in clause (iii), if a
complaining party demonstrates that a group of
employment practices results in a disparate impact, such
party shall not be reqtiired to demonstrate which specific
practice or practices within the group results in such
disparate impact;
"(ii) if the respondent demonstrates that a specific
employment practice within such group of employment
practices does not contribute to the disparate impact, the
respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such
practice is required by business necessity; and
"(iii) if the court finds that the complaining party
can identify, from records or other information of the
respondent reasonably available (through discovery or
otherwise), which specific practice or practices
contributed to the disparate impact-
"(I) the complaining party shall be required to
demonstrate which specific practioe or practices
contributed to the disparate impact; and
"(II) the respondent shall be required to
demonstrate business necessity only as to the specific
practice or practices demonstrated by the
complaining party to have contributed to the
disparate impact.
"(2) A demonstration that an employment practice is
required by business necessity may be used as a defense only
against a claim under this subsection.
"(3) Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, a rule
barring the employment of an individual who currently and
knowingly uses or possesses an illegal drug as defined in Schedules
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I and II of section 102(6) of the Controlled Substances Act (21
U.S.C. 802(6)), other than the use or possession of a drug taken
under the supervision of a licensed health care professional, or any
other use or possession authorized by the Controlled Substances
Act or any other provision of Federal law, shall be considered an
unlawful employment practice under this title only if such rule is
adopted or applied with an intent to discriminate because of the
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.".
SEC. 5. CLARIFYING PROHIBITION AGAINST IMPERMISSIBLE
CONSIDERATION OF RACE, COLOR, RELIGION, SEX OR
NATIONAL ORIGIN IN EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) (as amended by Section 4) is further
amended by adding at the end thereof the following new
subsection:
"(1) Discriminatory Practice Need Not Be Sole Contributing
Factor.-Except as otherwise provided in this title, an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was
a contributing factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also contributed to such practice.".
(b) ENFORCEMENT PROVISIONS.-Section 706(g) of such Act
(42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)) is amended by inserting before the period
in the last sentence the following: "or, in a case where a violation
is established under section 703(1), if the respondent establishes
that it would have taken the same action in the absence of any
discrimination. In any case in which a violation is established
under section 703(1), damages may be awarded only for injury
that is attributable to the unlawful employment practice".
SEC. 6. FACILITATING PROMPT AND ORDERLY RESOLUTION
OF CHALLENGES TO EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES
IMPLEMENTING LITIGATED OR CONSENT JUDGMENTS OR
ORDERS.
Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2)
(as amended by sections 4 and 5) is further amended by adding at the
end thereof the following new subsection:
"(m) FINALITY OF LITIGATED OR CONSENT JUDGMENTS OR
ORDERS.-
"(1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, and except
as provided in paragraph (2), an employment practice that
implements and is within the scope of a litigated or consent
,Judd
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judgment or order resolving a claim of employment discrimination
under the United States Constitution or Federal civil rights laws
may not be challenged in a claim under the United States
Constitution or Federal civil rights laws-
"(A) by a person who, prior to the entry of such
judgment or order, had-
"(i) actual notice from any source of the proposed
judgment or order sufficient to apprise such person that
such judgment or order might affect the interests of such
person and that an opportunity was available to present
objections to such judgment or order; and
"(ii) a reasonable opportunity to present objections
to such judgment or order;
"(B) by a person with respect to whom the requirements
of subparagraph (A) are not satisfied, if the court determines
that the interests of such person were adequately represented
by another person who challenged such judgment or other
prior to or after the entry of such judgment or order; or
"(C) if the court that entered the judgment or order
determines that reasonable efforts were made to provide
notice to interested persons.
A determination under subparagraph (C) shall be made prior to
the entry of the judgment or order, except that if the judgment or
order was entered prior to the date of the enactment of this
subsection, the determination may be made at any reasonable
time.
"(2) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to-
"(A) alter the standards for intervention under rule 24 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or apply to the rights of
parties who have successfully intervened pursuant to such rule
in the proceeding in which they intervened;
"(B) apply to the rights of parties to the action in which
the litigated or consent judgment or order was entered, or of
members of a class represented or sought to be represented in
such action, or of members of a group on whose behalf relief
was sought in such action by the Federal government;
"(C) prevent challenges to a litigated or consent
judgment or order on the ground that such judgment or order
was obtained through collusion or fraud, or is transparently
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"(D) authorize or permit the denial to any person of the
due process of law required by the United States Constitution.
"(3) Any action, not precluded under this subsection, that
challenges an employment practice that implements and is within
the scope of a litigated or consent judgment or order of the type
referred to in paragraph (1) shall be brought in the court, and if
possible before th judge, that entered such judgment or order.
Nothing in this subsection shall preclude a transfer of such action
pursuant to section 1404 of title 28, United States Code.".
SEC. 7. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS; APPLICATION TO
CHALLENGES TO SENIORITY SYSTEMS.
(a) STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-Section 706(e) of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e)) is amended-
(1) by striking out "one hundred and eighty days" and
inserting in lieu thereof "2 years";
(2) by inserting after "occurred" the first time it appears "or
has been applied to affect adversely the person aggrieved,
whichever is later,";
(3) by striking out ", except that in" and inserting in lieu
thereof ". In"; and
(4) by striking out "such charge shall be filed" and all that
follows through "whichever is earlier, and".
(b) APPLICATION TO CHALLENGES TO SENIORITY SYSTEMS.-
Section 703(h) of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2000e-2) is amended by
inserting after the first sentence the following new sentence: "Where a
seniority system or seniority practice is part of a collective bargaining
agreement and such system or practice was included in such agreement
with the intent to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin, the application of such system or practice during the
period that such collective bargaining agreement is in effect shall be an
unlawful employment practice.".
SEC. 8. PROVIDING FOR DAMAGES IN CASES OF
INTENTIONAL DISCRIMINATION
Section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-
5(g)) is amended by inserting before the last sentence the following
new sentences: "With respect to an unlawful employment practice
(other than an unlawful employment practice established in accordance
with section 703(k), or in the case of an unlawful employment practice
under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, other than an
unlawful employment practice established in accordance with
paragraph (3)(A) or paragraph (6) of section 102 of that Act, as it
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related to standards and criteria that tend to screen out individuals
with disabilities)-
"(A) compensatory damages may be awarded; and
"(B) if the respondent (other than a government, government
agency, or a political subdivision) engaged in the unlawful
employment practice with malice, or with reckless or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others, punitive
damages may be awarded against such respondent;
in addition to the relief authorized by the preceding sentences of this
subsection, except that compensatory damages shall not include
backpay or any interest thereon. Compensatory and punitive damages
and jury trials shall be available only for claims of intentional
discrimination. If compensatory or punitive damages are sought with
respect to a claim of intentional discrimination arising under this title,
any party may demand a trial by jury.".
SEC. 9. CLARIFYING ATTORNEYS' FEES PROVISION.
Section 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-
5(k)) is amended-
(1) by inserting "(1)" after "(k)";
(2) by inserting "(including expert fees and other litigation
expenses) and" after "attorney's fee,";
(3) by striking out "as part of the"; and
(4) by adding at the end thereof the following new
paragraphs:
"(2) No consent order or judgment settling a claim under this
title shall be entered, and no stipulation of dismissal of a claim
under this title shall be effective, unless the parties or their counsel
attest to the court that a waiver of all or substantially all
attorneys' fees was not compelled as a condition of the settlement.
"(3) In any action or proceeding in which any judgment or
order granting relief under this title is challenged, the court, in its
discretion, may allow the prevailing party in the original action
(other than the Commission or the United States) to recover from
the party against whom relief was granted in the original action a
reasonable attorney's fee (including expert fees and other litigation
expenses) and costs reasonably incurred in defending (as a party,
intervenor or otherwise) such judgment or order.".
SEC. 10. PROVIDING FOR INTEREST, AND EXTENDING THE
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS, IN ACTIONS AGAINST THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.
Section 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-16)
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(1) in subsection (c), by striking out "thirty days" and
inserting in lieu thereof "ninety days"; and
(2) in subsection (d), by inserting before the period ", and the
same interest to compensate for delay in payment shall be
available as in cases involving non-public parties, except that
prejudgment interest may not be awarded on compensatory
damages".
SEC. 11. CONSTRUCTION.
Title XI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000h et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
SEC. 1107. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION FOR CIVIL RIGHTS
LAWS.
"(a) EFFECTUATION OF PURPOSE.-All Federal laws protecting the
civil rights of persons shall be interpreted consistent with the intent of
such laws, and shall be broadly construed to effectuate the purpose of
such laws to provide equal opportunity and provide effective remedies.
"(b) NONLIMITATION.-Except as expressly provided, no Federal
law protecting the civil rights of persons shall be construed to repeal or
amend by implication any other Federal law protecting such civil
rights.
"(C) INTERPRETATION.-In interpreting Federal civil rights laws,
including laws protecting against discrimination on the basis of race,
color, national origin, sex, religion, age, and disability, courts and
administrative agencies shall not rely on the amendments made by the
Civil Rights Act of 1990 as a basis for limiting the theories of liability,
rights, and remedies available under civil rights laws not expressly
amended by such Act.".
SEC. 12. RESTORING PROHIBITION AGAINST ALL RACIAL
DISCRIMINATION IN THE MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT OF
CONTRACTS.
Section 1977 of the Revised Statutes of the United States (42
U.S.C. 1981) is amended-
(1) by inserting "(a)" before "All persons within"; and
(2) by adding at the end thereof the following new
subsections:
"(b) For purposes of this section, the right to 'make and enforce
contracts' shall include the making, performance, modification and
termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms and conditions of the contractual relationship.
"(c) The rights protected by this section are protected against
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impairment by nongovernmental discrimination as well as against
impairment under color of State law.".
SEC. 13. LAWFUL COURT-ORDERED REMEDIES,
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND CONCILIATION AGREEMENTS
NOT AFFECTED.
Nothing in the amendments made by this Act shall be construed
to require an employer to adopt hiring or promotion quotas on the basis
of race, color, religion, sex or national origin: Provided, however, that
nothing in the amendments made by this Act shall be construed to
affect court-ordered remedies, affirmative action, or conciliation
agreements that are otherwise in accordance with the law.
SEC. 14. SEVERABILITY.
If any provision of this Act, or an amendment made by this Act,
or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances is
held to be invalid, the remainder of this Act and the amendments made
by this Act, and the application of such provision to other persons and
circumstances, shall not be affected thereby.
SEC. 15. APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS AND TRANSITION
RULES.
(a) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENTS.-The amendments made by-
(1) section 4 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or
commenced after June 5, 1989;
(2) section 5 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or
commenced after May 1, 1989;
(3) section 6 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or
commenced after June 12, 1989;
(4) sections 7(a)(1), 7(a)(3) and 7(a)(4), 7(b), 8, 9, 10, and
11 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or commenced after
the date of enactment of this Act;
(5) section 7(a)(2) shall apply to all proceedings pending on
or commenced after June 12, 1989; and
(6) section 12 shall apply to all proceedings pending on or
commenced after June 15, 1989.
(b) TRANSITION RULES.-
(1) In general.-Any orders entered by a court between the
effective dates described in subsection (a) and the date of
enactment of this Act that are inconsistent with the amendments
made by sections 4, 5, 7(a)(2), or 12, shall be vacated if, not later
than 1 year after such date of enactment, a request for such relief
is made.
(2) Section 6.-Any orders entered between June 12, 1989
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and the date of enactment of this Act, that permit a challenge to
an employment practice that implements a litigated or consent
judgment or order and that is inconsistent with the amendment
made by section 6, shall be vacated if, not later than 6 months
after the date of enactment of this Act, a request for such relief is
made. For the 1-year period beginning on the date of enactment of
this Act, an individual whose challenge to an employment practice
that implements a litigated or consent judgment or order is denied
under the amendment made by section 6, or whose order or relief
obtained under such challenge is vacated under such section, shall
have the same right of intervention in the case in which the
challenged litigated or consent judgment or order was entered as
that individual had on June 12, 1989.
(c) Period of Limitations.-The period of limitations for the filing
of a claim or charge shall be tolled from the applicable effective date
described in subsection (a) until the date of enactment of this Act, on a
showing that the claim or charge was not filed because of a rule or
decision altered by the amendments made by sections 4, 5, 7(a)(2), or
12.
SEC. 16. CONGRESSIONAL COVERAGE.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000 et seq.)
is amended by adding at the end thereof the following new section:
SEC. 719. CONGRESSIONAL COVERAGE.
"Notwithstanding any other provision of this title, the provisions of
this title shall apply to the Congress of the United States, and the
means for enforcing this title as such applies to each House of Congress
shall be as determined by such House of Congress.".
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